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In Focus

Putin’s Invasion of Ukraine in 2022:
Implications for Strategic Studies
Antulio J. Echevarria II

ABSTRACT: This special commentary examines critical issues for the field of
strategic studies raised by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, including the waning of
major war, strategic coercion, and “War Amongst the People.” Drawing on previous
scholarship and current events, this commentary considers the questions raised by
the first major war of the twenty-first century. It provides recommendations for
scholars and senior leaders on how to work together to address the questions of
strategy and policy that have and continue to arise as the war progresses.

W
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hatever its outcome will be, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on
February 24, 2022, has the potential to shape the defense policies of
the United States, its strategic partners, and their rivals in decisive
ways. It is, after all, the first major war of the twenty-first century, one that involves
large numbers of conventional and irregular forces, and which has displaced millions
of civilians. At the time of this writing, the unofficial second phase of the invasion—
the battle for the Donbas and Luhansk oblasts—has only just begun. Yet many
research efforts have already begun to discern whether, or how, the operational
methods, the weapons, and tactics employed by the combatants will affect the future
of warfare. While these efforts will employ similar methodologies—interviewing key
Ukrainian (and some Russian) and other officials, gathering evidence of unit actions,
assessing damage to personnel and combat vehicles—the better analyses will probe
further than “Russian ineptitude” as the primary explanation for operational outcomes
and will explore whether any new military technologies or techniques have irrevocably
changed the conduct of war. Russian ineptitude, in any case, does not preclude an
eventual victory for Moscow. The campaigns in Chechnya, Syria, and Georgia show
the Russians can stumble initially but ultimately “win ugly” if given enough time and
moral space.1
Besides informing contemporary defense policies, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine
will offer an intriguing case study for the rather broad field of strategic studies.
To begin with, analyses of the war in Ukraine and all its preludes will shed light on the six
principal explanations for the apparent decline in the incidence of major war since 1945.
It will also add to the growing body of literature on strategic coercion, particularly with
1. On the latter conflict, see Robert E. Hamilton and Ariel Cohen, The Russian Military and the Georgia
War: Lessons and Implications (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2011), https://press.armywarcollege.edu
/monographs/576.
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respect to the criticality of information flow as well as the effectiveness of extensive
financial and cultural sanctions. Similarly, the war may reveal much about the
continued usefulness of the popular paradigm, “war amongst the people,” advanced
by British General Rupert Smith some two decades ago. Furthermore, it could tell
us a great deal about those forces—enmity, chance, political purpose—commonly
associated with the Clausewitzian model of war’s nature, especially the power
of enmity as a strategic multiplier. This special commentary offers some initial
thoughts about each topic in turn. But it is important to make clear this list is
hardly exhaustive.

The Waning of Major War
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s most recent invasion of Ukraine undermines
the popular notion that large-scale, interstate wars have become passé. Some
pundits have argued the declining occurrence of major wars since World War II is
evidence that armed conflict itself is disappearing altogether.2 While few scholars
seem willing to go to that extreme, they do offer six explanations (discussed
below) for what on the surface appears to be a marked decline in the frequency of
large-scale conflicts.3 But the interesting implication for strategic studies is half of
these explanations functioned as accelerants rather than as deterrents for Putin’s
act of aggression against Ukraine.
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. According to this explanation,
major wars have declined in number due to the risk such wars pose of nuclear
escalation, which could well lead to unparalleled devastation if not mutual
annihilation. Instead, states have opted to pursue limited conflicts that do not
present existential threats to other regimes or to compete within the so-called
gray zone, the realm of aggression short of war. As some sources have noted,
however, Putin chose to launch large-scale operations against Ukraine precisely
because his previous invasions led only to “frozen conflicts” in the Donbas
and Luhansk oblasts and his gray-zone activities have not yielded the results
he desired.4
The spread of democracies and democratic values. This explanation suggests
the decline of major wars has occurred because the number of democracies
worldwide is increasing, and democracies purportedly do not go to war with
2. Steven Pinker, The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined (New York: Viking, 2011);
and for a critique, see Bear F. Braumoeller, Only the Dead: The Persistence of War in the Modern Age
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2019).
3. For a summary of the main arguments, see Raimo Väyrynen, ed., The Waning of Major War: Theories and
Debates (New York: Routledge, 2006).
4. Michael Kofman and Ryan Evans, “Interpreting the First Few Days of the Russo-Ukrainian War,”
War on the Rocks (website), podcast, 25:07, February 28, 2022; and on frozen conflicts, see Erik J. Grossman,
“Russia’s Frozen Conflicts and the Donbas,” Parameters 48, no. 2 (Summer 2018): 51–62.
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one another.5 Yet, as multiple accounts have indicated, Putin perceived Ukraine’s
movement toward a fully democratic and representative government as a threat
to his style of autocratic rule. Thus, he opted to arrest that progress with military
force. In this case, therefore, the spread of democracy and democratic values
increased, rather than decreased, the likelihood of a major war. Given the fact
that autocratic regimes frequently see democracies as threats, the spread of
democracy itself appears likely to cause more wars before it can be said to cause
fewer of them.
The growth of multilateral institutions. Multilateral institutions, such as the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the United Nations (UN),
and the European Union (EU), are believed to have reduced both the number
and scale of armed conflicts by increasing security more collectively and by
creating “new normative standards, communication channels, and institutional
practices.”6 These new alternatives and customs have provided states with
opportunities to enhance their security and to channel their competitiveness in
less belligerent ways. Unfortunately, Putin saw at least one of those multilateral
organizations, namely NATO, as a threat to his security. In 1946, George
Kennan described the Russian mind as perennially suspicious and insecure,
a characterization we may hope will one day be overcome by events.7 But that
day is not yet here. In terms familiar to students of Thomas Schelling, even an
alliance built merely to deter must, by definition, be intimidating.8
Increasing economic integration. According to this explanation, governments
refrain from choosing armed conflict to settle their grievances because war
in general and interstate war in particular cause a high degree of economic
disruption. Armed conflict clearly benefits some sectors of the global defense
industry; however, it disrupts commerce and financial markets, driving up prices
and increasing other costs even for parties not directly involved in the conflict.
Even though the Russian economy is relatively small compared to many Western
economies, the sanctions imposed on it by the West have started a ripple effect
that some experts warn might halt globalization and separate the world’s
economy into three spheres: a Chinese-led one, a US-led one, and a European
one divided between the other two.9 Whether or not the effects extend that far,
fears over the negative impact a major war might have on an integrated global
economy are at least partially founded, as second- and third-order economic
5. Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., Debating the Democratic Peace
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996).
6. Väyrynen, Waning of Major War, 19.
7. X [George F. Kennan], “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs 25, no. 4 (July 1947): 566–82.
8. Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), 174–77.
9. Adam S. Posen, “The End of Globalization? What Russia’s War in Ukraine Means for the World
Economy,” Foreign Affairs (website), March 17, 2022, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world
/2022-03-17/end-globalization.
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effects are notoriously difficult to predict. For his part, Putin gambled in two
ways: that Russian financial institutions would find sufficient workarounds
to remain effective and that the campaign in Ukraine would conclude before
sanctions could take full effect. On the first gamble he was correct; however, it
remains to be seen how much longer the Russian economy, the 11th largest in
the world with a GDP of $1.70 trillion in 2019, can endure such pressures as the
conflict becomes more protracted.10
The influence of international law and the law of armed conflict. This rationale
suggests the influence of international law and the law of armed conflict have
restricted the reasons states may legally go to war, and how they may wage it.
To be sure, to have legal restraints on the conduct of war is useful. But for this
explanation to be persuasive, prosecutions of war criminals must occur in a
timely fashion.11 Historically, that has not been the case. For example, “It took
two decades for the Nazi Adolf Eichmann to be called to account. It was
two and-a-half decades for former Chilean President Augusto Pinochet, and
four decades for Kang Kek Iew, Nuon Chea, and Khieu Samphan.”12 Clearly,
the existence of the International Criminal Court and the promise of postconflict investigations into possible war crimes neither dissuaded Putin from
invading Ukraine, nor from allowing his troops to attack non-military targets.
In fact, attacking noncombatants appears to be one of the Russian army’s
primary tactics.
The spread of anti-war norms. This explanation says the expansion of
anti-war norms has made it much more difficult to “sell” a contemporary
populace on the need to participate in an armed conflict. To be sure, anti-war
norms have ebbed and flowed throughout modern history. Nonetheless, they
represent an important measure of national will (or international will in some
cases). They also have a critical downside in that aggressors can leverage such
attitudes to bully states into policies of appeasement. Putin has successfully
employed that tactic throughout much of his presidency. Fortunately, the situation
reversed itself after his invasion of Ukraine. Most of the free world, with the
assistance of a brilliant Ukrainian information campaign, bonded emotionally
with President Volodymyr Zelensky and the Ukrainian people and came to see the
Russian state as having brutally victimized its peace-loving neighbor.
10. “Russia GDP 1998–2022, Macrotrends (website), n.d., https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/RUS
/russia/gdp-gross-domestic-product.
11. Oona A. Hathaway, “International Law Goes to War in Ukraine: The Legal Pushback to Russia’s
Invasion,” Foreign Affairs (website), March 15, 2022, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine
/2022-03-15/international-law-goes-war-ukraine; and Davida E. Kellogg, “Jus Post Bellum: The Importance of
War Crimes Trials,” Parameters 32, no. 3 (Autumn 2002), https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol32
/iss3/8/.
12. Michael Byers, “Justice Delayed: Why International Law Still Matters,” Foreign Affairs (website),
September 22, 2016, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/review-essay/2016-09-22/justice-delayed.
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In theory, all six explanations offer plausible reasons for the alleged decline
of major conflicts since World War II. In practice, however, none dissuaded
Putin from opting to launch a major assault against Ukraine. Indeed, of the six
explanations, the first three functioned more as accelerants or enablers of Putin’s
plans for war rather than as decelerants. The fourth, economic integration, is in
some ways neutral: it affects aggressors, defenders, and nonaligned parties alike,
though certainly not equally. On the one hand, it demonstrates why sanctions and
economic embargoes have become weapons of first resort in the modern era, at
least for pro-Western democracies with robust economies. On the other hand,
these measures require time and the cooperation of other parties to be effective,
and such cooperation cannot be assumed regardless of the severity of the case.
Members of the international community have already begun to experience
adverse effects from the sanctions and embargoes imposed on Russia, turning
the process of economic punishment into a war of attrition and exhaustion in
which all sides must endure some costs. Perhaps not surprisingly, the influence
of international law and the law of armed conflict neither dissuaded Putin nor
his top leaders. But perhaps they offer hope of exacting some form of legal
justice in the future that might influence other actors. The last explanation, the
spread of anti-war norms, clearly offers aggressors advantages during peacetime
but quickly works against them in wartime. Anti-war sentiments transformed
almost overnight into antipathy for the Russians and sympathy for the Ukrainians.
Before the invasion, Putin’s bullying tactics gave him a distinct advantage in
dealing with heads of state who wanted to avoid war. But he lost that edge once the
conflict started and then antipathy grew which led to a host of cultural sanctions,
such as barring Russian athletes from competing in international events.
But this list is also instructive for what it omits. Oddly, a seventh potential
explanation for the low incidence of interstate wars since 1945 is the relative
balance of military power, especially regionally. Heads of state might indeed fear
nuclear escalation and may have avoided armed conflict as a result, but they also
might have been deterred by the fact that they possess little in the way of a decisive
military advantage over their rivals. This contemporary “balance of power” is not
the “balance of nuclear terror” that existed between NATO and the Warsaw Pact
during the Cold War. But it might be as effective, and it might be one reason
states have decided to compete within the “gray zone,” below the threshold of
war, rather than above it. Obviously, as Putin’s current war in Ukraine proves,
miscalculation is always possible, and deterrence, like any strategy, is only as stable
as the pace of technological innovation permits. Yet something should be said for
the possibility some would-be aggressors have been soberly calculating their odds
of succeeding militarily, and have decided not to take the risk.
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Strategic Coercion—A Closer Look
The conflict in Ukraine offers an important case study regarding the exercise
of strategic coercion—the “deliberate and purposive use of overt threats to
influence another’s strategic choices”—within the context of a major war.13
The literature concerning strategic coercion is substantial and is still growing.
Most of it, however, deals with parties that are not significant economic or military
powers armed with nuclear weapons. Assuming reliable insights will eventually
emerge regarding Putin’s decision making, the concept of strategic coercion
stands to advance in at least three topics: the critical nature of the flow of accurate
information, the integral value of the dynamic of compellence and deterrence,
and the efficacy of short- and long-term financial and economic sanctions.
For controlled coercion to take place, the target must receive reasonably
accurate information about the strategic situation, including combat losses,
and—to borrow Schelling’s words—the “pain yet to come” for noncompliance.
Otherwise, reducing an adversary’s military power and strategic advantages
lacks coercive value. If targets simply reject accurate (but perhaps unpleasant)
information, as irrational actors sometimes do, that is one matter. If the targets
are simply not receiving it, that is another matter, and it requires a different
approach lest the attempt at strategic coercion fail for the wrong reasons.
Research on strategic coercion has been aware of the problem of irrational
actors for some time and has made progress in tackling it. However, it has not
completely separated the irrational actor problem from the “ignorant actor”
problem. We know Putin was not receiving accurate information from his
subordinate commanders and advisers; he eventually took some corrective
measures, but the situation might not be fully resolved. At the same time,
numerous theories surfaced—from “mad man” to “victim of stroke”—claiming
Putin was an irrational actor and had to be treated as such.14 But we would
presumably treat a “mad man” differently than we would someone who is
malevolent but ignorant because the latter would have thresholds he would not
want to cross; whereas the former would not. To further complicate matters,
Putin could be both irrational and ignorant. Nevertheless, the larger point is
strategic coercion theory (and practice) would benefit from more research into
how best to distinguish between the two.
13. Lawrence Freedman, ed., Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2003), 3, 15; and Kelly M. Greenhill and Peter Krause, eds., Coercion: The Power to Hurt in International
Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018).
14. Michael Krepon, “Putin Plays the Mad Man Card in Ukraine,” Forbes (website),
March 1, 2022, https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelkrepon/2022/03/01/putin-plays-the-mad-man-card
-in-ukraine/?sh=6d58ef2a1405; and Maggie Fox, “Why Does Vladimir Putin Walk Like That?,”
NBC News (website), December 15, 2015, https://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-news/why-does
-vladimir-putin-walk-n480611.
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Research into strategic coercion might also address how the concept’s two
essential components, compellence and deterrence, could function as a synthetic
dynamic. Separating the two has some value, particularly with respect to
education. But it tends to obscure their complementary nature: they are
interrelated counterparts, not complete opposites. Compellence often requires
some form of deterrence, and deterrence typically involves some form of
compellence. Together they round out strategic coercion, the aim of which is
to make our adversaries do what we want—and not something else. Clausewitz
and Schelling saw it the same way. They understood war to be an act of force to
compel our adversaries to do what we want—which also implies denying our
adversaries the ability to do something we do not want.15 For example, an invasion
aimed at compelling the capitulation of a head of state should also include
measures for deterring an insurgency should the first aim be accomplished.
Fortunately, Putin invaded Ukraine with forces insufficient to accomplish the
first objective, and it is unclear he had properly considered the second. For their
part, the Ukrainians and those supporting them want to compel Putin to give up
his aggressive intentions, while also deterring him from escalating.
We find this synthetic, compellence-deterrence dynamic at work in nearly
all conflicts short of Schelling’s notion of “brute force,” that is, those situations
inimical to the bargaining model of war.16 An example is using military force
to perpetrate genocide, which eschews arriving at a negotiated settlement or
a bargain of any sort.17 Campaigns sometimes begin as exercises in brute force
but then transition to the bargaining model if the defenders’ resistance is too
strong. Combining compellence and deterrence into a single dynamic will also
facilitate gaining better control over adversaries and crisis situations. Modern
articulations of strategies of control reach back to the 1950s and 1960s in the
works of J. C. Wylie, Henry Eccles, and Herbert Rosinski; their concept of
control should be reexamined and developed further for application in today’s
strategic environment.18 The conflict in Ukraine will afford opportunities for
strategic theorists and practitioners to study how the two components of
coercion might function together and what their limitations might be. In short,
the conflict in Ukraine, because of its strategic scale and operational scope, will
offer new data which will improve the concept of strategic coercion. These data
should justify fusing compellence and deterrence together more formally, rather
15. Carl von Clausewitz, Hinterlasseneswerk Vom Kriege, ed. Werner Hahlweg, 19th ed. (Frankfurt:
Ferdinand, 1980), bk. 1, chap. 1, 191–92; Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. Michael Howard
and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 76; and Schelling, Arms and Influence, 2.
16. Schelling, Arms and Influence, 1–3.
17. For a broader definition of brute force, see Robert Mandel, Coercing Compliance: State-Initiated Brute
Force in Today’s World (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015), 4, 6–7.
18. On strategy of control, see Antulio J. Echevarria II, War’s Logic: Strategic Thought in the American Way
of War (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2021), 130–42.
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than informally or accidentally. Eventually, that process should be routinized in
military training and execution.
Along similar lines, and to return to a topic mentioned above, Putin’s invasion
of Ukraine will shed light on the coercive power of financial sanctions on a
large, modern state with strong economic ties, especially in terms of oil and gas,
to the West. At present, the sanctions consist of a combination of targeted and
comprehensive sanctions, which the West can increase or decrease as necessary
but not without some unwanted secondary or tertiary effects. Research into
the coercive power of sanctions (or economic coercion) suggests they work best
under specific conditions: (1) when costs to the target are significant,
(2) the senders’ costs are minimal, (3) the issue of dispute is of low importance
to the target, (4) the sender and target are closely allied, (5) sanctions are endorsed
by an international institution, and (6) the target state is a democracy.19 As readers
will note, only three of the six conditions obtain with respect to Russia’s current
invasion of Ukraine.
While sanctions have become a weapon of choice for modern democracies,
they also have a long and not entirely successful history.20 They have the advantage
of being flexible, able to serve in a deterrence or compellence role, or both.
The West has used them against Russia in both capacities, including the erosion
of Moscow’s ability to manufacture war material and to resupply its forces
over the long term. (Inept Russian logistical planning also added to the costimposing effects of sanctions in the short term.) By some accounts, the effect
of sanctions may reduce Russia’s GDP by as much as 12 percent in 2022.21 It is
unclear how effective Russian countermeasures will be. Economic sanctions may
remain a weapon of first resort in the future. But, as with any weapon, adversaries
and potential adversaries will have studied its effectiveness and adopted
some countermeasures.

War amongst the People—Still
In the early twenty-first century, British General Rupert Smith attempted to
introduce a new paradigm of armed conflict which he referred to as “War amongst
the People.”22 This paradigm, which was intended to shift defense thinking and
19. Daniel R. Drezner, “Economic Sanctions in Theory and Practice: How Smart Are They?,” in Greenhill
and Krause, eds., Coercion, 251–70; as the author explains, even post–Cold War and other data sets have not
changed the contingent nature of the results.
20. Nicholas Mulder, The Economic Weapon: The Rise of Sanctions as a Tool of Modern War
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2022); and Juan C. Zarate, Treasury’s War: The Unleashing of a New
Era of Financial Warfare (New York: Public Affairs, 2013).
21. Elliot Smith, “Russia’s Economy Is Beginning to Crack as Economists Forecast Sharp Contractions,”
CNBC (website), April 4, 2022, https://www.cnbc.com/2022/04/04/russias-economy-is-beginning-to-crack
-as-economists-forecast-sharp-contractions.html.
22. Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (New York: Vintage Books,
2005, 2007).
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procurement in the West away from its preoccupation with force-on-force conflicts,
or what Smith refers to as “interstate industrial wars,” to contemporary wars. These
wars are characterized by six major trends. First, the ends for which wars were
fought have changed from the “hard absolute objectives of interstate industrial
war to more malleable objectives to do with the individual and societies that are
not states.” Second, wars were now fought “amongst the people,” as exemplified
by the “central role of the media,” which bring armed conflicts into “every living
room,” even as they are being fought in streets and fields far abroad. Third, modern
conflicts “tend to be timeless,” since they center on establishing conditions that
must be maintained until treaties or peace agreements are reached, which can
require years or decades. Fourth, fighting takes place in a manner designed “not
to lose the force,” rather than employing the force and expending it as necessary
in pursuit of the overall aim of the conflict. Fifth, “old weapons” designed for
industrial war were of necessity being adapted to “new uses,” to accommodate
“war amongst the people.” Sixth, the sides in contemporary conflicts consist
mostly of nonstate actors, meaning multinational groupings, such as alliances or
coalitions, were pitted against parties that were not states.
Smith can be faulted for attempting to use Thomas Kuhn’s framework of
conceptual paradigms to describe different types of wars.23 Paradigms are better
at describing the systems of thought or ways individuals and groups think about
things than the things themselves. Wars are notorious for the “contemporaneity
of the non-contemporaneous,” a phrase once popular among French and German
sociologists to describe generational overlap, that is, when individuals of two or
more generations occupy the same space and time. An example is Western society
in the 1960s, when a younger generation embracing anti-establishment values
clashed with an older, more conservative one hewing to traditionalism.
In short, classifying phenomena according to periods can be problematic
because things can be in an era without being of that era. So, it is with wars.
Industrial-age, interstate conflicts such as World War I and World War II occurred
temporally with many of America’s “Banana Wars,” for instance, in which the US
military often had to deal with violent nonstate actors. Yet the two types clearly
differed. (The two world wars, incidentally, were fought by alliances, which Smith
and others classify as nonstate actors.) The United States has participated in at
least 10 times more noninterstate, nonindustrial-age wars than it has interstate,
industrial-age wars.24 Nothing about the twenty-first century thus far suggests this
ratio will change in favor of interstate wars.
23. Smith, Utility of Force, 4–5; and Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago:
University of Chicago, 1962).
24. Barbara Salazar Torreon and Sofia Plagakis, Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad,
1798–2022, Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report R42878, updated March 8, 2022
(Washington, DC: CRS, March 8, 2022), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/details?prodcode=R42738.
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While his attempt to classify wars is problematic, Smith should not be faulted
for having tried to persuade defense establishments in the West to develop better
tools for fighting nonindustrial, noninterstate wars. That dream is both a noble
one and a worthwhile goal. Not surprisingly, it remains both. Western defense
establishments continue to resist investing in the requirements needed to deal
with such wars, perhaps because the larger profits come with producing the
military hardware necessary for interstate wars. This is not to say the West should
forgo preparing to fight interstate wars, which have always been high-risk but
low incidence. Rather, the West can, and should, commit itself to prepare for and,
when necessary, to conduct both types of wars.
Most of the trends Smith identified are correct, though one might quibble
about his description of the absolute nature of political aims; the Korean War
and the Vietnam War, for instance, were examples of negotiated settlements.
The salient characteristic Smith rightly ascribes to new wars, such as
counterinsurgencies and peacekeeping operations, is they occur amongst the
people. But as the conflict in Ukraine shows, that characteristic also holds true
for major wars today. As of April 5, 2022, for instance, the UN migration agency
reported some 11 million people had been displaced within Ukraine and more
than 4 million had fled Ukraine.25 Refugees would have impacted any conflict that
might have broken out in Central Europe during the Cold War, though Smith’s
point is military doctrine and training exercises at the time rarely took account of
the refugee flow and how its presence might impede operational maneuver.
In the current conflict in Ukraine, noncombatant populations are not only
refugees but defenseless targets. Video evidence and personal testimonies have
implicated the Russian military in war crimes because it directly targeted civilians
in flagrant disregard of international law and the law of armed conflict. To be
sure, populations across the globe are watching this conflict play out on their
television sets, iPads, and computer screens. The suffering they have witnessed
has caused them to put pressure on their governments to do more to support
the Ukrainian cause. NATO, the European Union, and others have responded
by increasing sanctions, and transferring more arms, money, and other support
to Ukraine.
In sum, noncombatants have become participants in this war just as much as
Ukrainian and Russian military personnel, and despite the law of armed conflict.
This war is, thus, a war amongst the people in every sense, even though it is
interstate and multinational in character. Western military strategy and doctrine
25. Associated Press, “Live Updates: UN Says 11 Million Have Fled Homes in Ukraine, AOL
(website), April 5, 2022, https://www.aol.com/news/live-updates-ukraine-reports-russian-063640006-1220
04857.html.
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must account for this fact as this phenomenon is likely to manifest itself again in
other theaters, regardless of the scale or political aims of the conflict.

War’s Changing Character and Dynamic Nature
The fact that the conflict in Ukraine is also a war amongst the people raises
an important question about the relationship between war’s character and its
nature. To be sure, the US military believes war’s character—the institutions that
participate in armed conflict, the weapons and doctrines employed, and the whole
process of warfare itself—changes over time and varies across cultures. However,
the US military also believes war’s nature is constant because every armed
conflict, no matter how large or small, consists of political motives, human
emotions, and the element of chance. While that point is demonstrably true, it
merely tells us what the common denominators are that unify all wars without
telling us that they, too, fluctuate and interact. They are dynamic, perhaps even
more so than the institutions that make up war’s character.
We can find an important example of that dynamism in the current war in
Ukraine in which human emotions, especially enmity, have motivated the
defenders to resist the superior numbers of the Russian invaders. They are
essentially fighting what Clausewitz would have recognized as a war of national
resistance or national liberation in which the citizenry often takes up arms. But in
this case, the spirit of enmity has more than a tactical significance. It has become
a strategic multiplier thanks in large part to the support most of the free world
is showing toward Ukraine with massive amounts of military and other aid.
The Ukrainians have threatened to continue resisting by means of an
insurgency should their regular military be defeated. Insurrections were one of the
reasons Clausewitz saw the defense as the stronger form of war. By his reasoning
the defender had the easier task, to survive; while the attacker, who must subdue
the defender, had the harder mission. A military force can be defeated, and its
government overthrown, but until its citizenry consents to the aggressor’s terms,
or is subdued, the fighting will not end. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in
1979 and the West’s campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan during this century have
shown us what insurgencies can mean for an occupying force.
So, while research efforts into the conflict in Ukraine examine what aspects of
war’s character might have changed, they would do well to consider war’s nature
as well. The result might have serious implications for policies of defense and
deterrence in Eastern Europe where conventional forces backed by trained and
equipped irregulars might prove cost-effective indeed.
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Conclusions and Recommendations
In sum, research into the conflict in Ukraine will offer a wealth of answers to
some fundamental questions in the field of strategic studies. Paradoxically, it will
also create more questions for academics to ponder. Moreover, each of the topics
discussed above informs the general context of the war in Ukraine in important
ways. Three of the explanations for the decline of major war, for instance, also
contributed to shaping Putin’s justifications for the 2022 invasion of Ukraine.
Theories of strategic coercion, in turn, influenced the quality of each side’s thrusts
and parries. “War amongst the people” is still a valid way to frame modern conflict,
though it includes many more dimensions than its author originally conceived.
Finally, the motivational element of war’s nature has proven quite powerful
indeed in favor of one side and to the obvious detriment of the other.
What should military staff colleges, war colleges, and civilian programs for
strategic studies do while research is underway to determine what about the
character of war might have changed? First, they should encourage the further
exploration of these themes and others related to large-scale, interstate conflict by
hosting conferences and seminars where participants can exchange views. Second,
they should promote more research into the topic of major war by seeking funding
for grants and collaboration opportunities; the US Department of Defense can
help immensely by establishing or re-establishing a series of research grants and
fellowship programs, such as the Minerva program. Third, they should encourage
revisions to their core curricula to accommodate what some might describe as the
“return of major war” and find ways to incentivize faculty to offer electives covering
some of the aforementioned topics as well as other related themes. Fourth, all
academic and military educational institutions can increase the value of modern
war-gaming and simulations exercises by sponsoring or facilitating research that
adds to historical databases on armed conflicts; analytics enhanced by artificial
intelligence technologies can augment the cultivation of those databases. Finally,
both academe and military educational institutions should look for ways to bridge
the cultural gaps between them and to foster collaborative research; each has
valuable insights to offer to the study of armed conflict in all its manifestations.
If only the dead have seen the end of war, only the living can study it. And the
study of future war, to include its prevention and mitigation, can only take place in
the present.
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